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ZOIS REPORT

RUSSIAN CANADIANS:
VIEWS ON POLITICS,
HISTORY AND SOCIETY

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Summary

Canada is a multicultural country where migrants with a (Soviet) Russian background are one of many minorities. This community has received scant attention to date, partly because it largely dissolves into the overall population, and the socio-economic integration of newcomers from Russia tends to be relatively smooth. Although people with a (Soviet) Russian background are not a large demographic group, Russian speakers, including migrants from other former Soviet republics, form a sizeable share of the migrants who speak neither of Canada's two official languages as their first language. The Kremlin views this group as a resource that can potentially be leveraged.

This report is one of the first to provide reliable insights into a large sample of respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background relative to the broader Canadian population. We have surveyed over 500 such respondents alongside more than 1,800 Canadians from the general population. Additionally, for a significant share of all respondents, we collected data from two household members: an adult child and a parent. This allowed us to grasp where family dynamics differ between Canadians with and without a (Soviet) Russian background. For respondents with (Soviet) Russian roots, the adult child was socialised in Canada and thus represents the second generation, whereas the parental generation itself migrated from (Soviet) Russia.

The key findings are as follows:

- Compared to the general Canadian population, respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, in particular the second generation, have lower trust in Canadian state institutions and the principle of democracy while showing greater support for economic liberalism.
- The offspring of Russian migrants is much less likely to participate in Canadian elections than their parents or peers. While one-third of the parental generation usually votes in Russian elections, hardly anyone from the second generation does so.
- Individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background tend to be socially conservative. They tend to believe that men should be the main breadwinner and to support traditional gender norms, more so than other Canadians.
- Younger people with a (Soviet) Russian background are less politically and socially active than their peers, with the exception of commenting on politics via social media.
- While a clear majority of Canadians believes that Russia alone is responsible for the war in Ukraine, two-thirds of individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background disagree with this view. Older respondents are particularly supportive of the Kremlin's position that the war against Ukraine is in reaction to Western aggression.
- Individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background have a rather distant relationship to (Soviet) Russian history and are not very defensive when it is criticised. This suggests that the potential for the Kremlin to invoke patriotic sentiment through historical narratives might be limited.
- Compared to other groups with a migratory background, those from (Soviet) Russia have relatively little contact with friends and family members back in Russia. Travel to Russia is also rare.
- Families with a (Soviet) Russian background discuss politics more frequently than other Canadian families, with fathers being the dominant figures in these discussions. In addition, for the younger generation in these families, their parents and social media are the most important sources of historical knowledge, whereas other Canadians emphasise the importance of history teaching at school.

Introduction

Canada stands out globally for its high proportion of migrants, with first- and second-generation immigrants accounting for 39 per cent of the population—a figure expected to rise further in the coming years.¹ The arrival of migrants has long been supported politically and socially, with most Canadians viewing them as beneficial to their communities.² Public sentiment has shifted, however, since 2023, when Canadians began to judge immigration levels as being too high. This recent backlash against migration is palpable in political discourse. Justin Trudeau’s government reduced the number of highly exploited ‘temporary workers’ after being consistently pressurised on this issue by the Conservative Party under Pierre Poilievre.

This report focuses on a distinct group within Canada’s migrant population: individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background.³ Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the situation of this group has become more contested. The war and its global repercussions have altered perceptions of people with Russian roots, making their integration more challenging and raising questions about their political loyalties amid escalating geopolitical tensions. These individuals are a particular target of Russia’s attempts to foster certain social and political values among Russian speakers abroad, values that often conflict with those that prevail in Canada.

This report is based on a multigenerational survey, conducted using the Léger Online Panel, and several focus groups with individuals living in the Greater Toronto Area and Alberta, conducted with Pivotal Research. We partnered with Decision Point Research to recruit individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background. Together, this data provides unique insights into Canada’s population with a (Soviet) Russian background. Data collection took place in the spring and autumn of 2024.

1 The authors are grateful to Varvara Ilyina and Macha Gharbi for their research assistance. We also want to acknowledge the helpful comments by Ian Garner and Marcus Wong on an earlier version and input provided by colleagues at ZOiS.

2 Neli Esipova, Julie Ray and Dato Tsubutashvili, ‘Canada No. 1 for Migrants, U.S. in Sixth Place’, Gallup, 23 September 2020, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/320669/canada-migrants-sixth-place.aspx>. Two-thirds of Canadians view immigrants as a strength rather than a burden. Ana Gonzalez-Barrera and Phillip Connor, ‘Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength than a Burden’, Pew Research Center, 14 March 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global-migration-and-demography/2019/03/14/around-the-world-more-say-immigrants-are-a-strength-than-a-burden/>.

3 The term ‘with a (Soviet) Russian background’ refers here to individuals who themselves migrated to Canada from (Soviet) Russia after their secondary socialisation or have at least one parent with such a migration history. We focus specifically on individuals socialised in the multi-ethnic Russian Federation (or, prior to 1991, the Russian Soviet Republic), which is a narrower group than the broader Russian-speaking population. For readability, we occasionally use alternatives to the term ‘with a (Soviet) Russian background’ in reference to the same group of people.

The context: Multicultural Canada

A close examination of Canada's population with a (Soviet) Russian background reveals where multiculturalism works well and where tensions arise. According to the 2021 census, Russian Canadians account for about 548,000 individuals, roughly 1.5 per cent of the national population. There is broad acceptance of multiculturalism in Canadian society,⁴ albeit with significant regional variation. While metropolitan areas like Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver tend to embrace the cosmopolitan understanding of Canada, in Alberta and other more rural provinces, a more conservative political climate prevails, with greater scepticism towards federal immigration policies.

Russian Canadians account for roughly 1.5 per cent of the national population.

Canada's multicultural approach is rooted in the concept of 'multicultural nationalism',⁵ which encourages newcomers to maintain their distinct ethnic and cultural identities, while rapidly accessing Canadian citizenship.⁶ This contrasts with countries like Germany, where citizenship is harder for migrants to obtain and cultural assimilation is more strongly emphasised, or the United States with its 'melting pot' model that prioritises integration over the preservation of distinct identities. The Canadian approach to migrant integration builds solidarity through shared values rather than a unified identity. As a result, national identity is not tightly connected to historical narratives, and Canada remains cautious about imposing a strong historical vision in general.⁷ Rather than history serving as a bond between citizens, it is 'multiculturalism [that] serves as a link for native-born citizens from national identity to solidarity with immigrants.'⁸

This understanding of multiculturalism is not without challenges. The Conservative Party of Canada under Pierre Poilievre promises to reduce the number of immigrants and has accused Trudeau of ruining the 'multi-generational consensus'. The Conservative leader has also pushed for a socio-cultural integration of newcomers, demanding that Canada become a 'hyphenated society' rather than one where different ethnicities coexist. Meanwhile, discrimination of racialised minorities is undermining their sense of belonging to Canada.⁹ While the public continues to support immigration, anti-Muslim sentiment is prevalent, with Islam perceived as a threat to Canada's liberal-democratic identity. The political parties need to balance support for multiculturalism, which appeals to migrant voters, with anti-Muslim sentiment and the realities of the housing and healthcare sector.¹⁰

4 Kaylee Brink, 'Canadian Multiculturalism, Identity, and Reconciliation: Evidence from a National Survey', *American Review of Canadian Studies* 53.2 (2023): 172.

5 Tariq Modood, 'Multiculturalism as a New Form of Nationalism?', *Nations and Nationalism* 26.2 (2020): 308.

6 Will Kymlicka, 'Multiculturalism as Citizenization: Past and Future' in *Assessing Multiculturalism in Global Comparative Perspective*, edited by Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Alain-G Gagnon and Arjun Tremblay, (London and New York: Routledge, 2022), p. 24.

7 An exception is the recognition of historical injustices towards the Indigenous people of Canada.

8 Will Kymlicka, 'The Precarious Resilience of Multiculturalism in Canada', *American Review of Canadian Studies* 51.1 (2021): 122.

9 Zheng Wu, Maria Finnsdottir, 'Perceived Racial and Cultural Discrimination and Sense of Belonging in Canadian Society', *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie* 58.2 (2021): 229.

10 Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos and Jameela Rasheed, 'A Religion Like No Other: Islam and the Limits of Multiculturalism in Canada', Working Paper 2020/14 in the Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS) and the CERC Working Paper series: 1 – 19.

Canada's (Soviet) Russian community

The population with a (Soviet) Russian background is largely overlooked in today's Canada.¹¹ It is, however, an important group if we consider Russia's proactive targeting of 'compatriots' in the context of a global competition to control its diaspora populations.

Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background are primarily concentrated in major cities, particularly in Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta. Canada's landscape of Russian associations is diverse, encompassing cultural and religious organisations, primarily Jewish and Russian Orthodox. It also includes online communities on platforms that cater to a variety of interests. Some online groups focus on exchanging Russian goods and services or promoting cultural activities, such as student movie nights. Others are more overtly nationalistic, organising Victory Day marches and expressing pro-Russian views and criticism of Ukraine.¹² At the same time, there are groups within the Russian diaspora that take an oppositional stance and engage in cultural cooperation with Ukrainian or other Slavic diaspora communities.

In an attempt to sow confusion over Russia's war in Ukraine, Russia has been conducting a propaganda campaign targeted at both the Russian diaspora and broader Canadian society. These propaganda efforts span traditional Russian state media outlets, such as Russia Today, new media platforms like Tenet Media, and controversial figures like Lauren Southern. The Kremlin's framing of the war in Ukraine as a struggle against Western aggression resonates with some individuals on the far right and far left of the political spectrum.¹³ Russian propaganda has also come in the guise of Anastasia Trofimova's film 'Russians at War', funded by the Canada Media Fund and Ontario's public broadcaster TVO. The film has sparked a debate over its portrayal of the war in Ukraine, with critics accusing it of whitewashing Russian war crimes.¹⁴

Canada is also home to the world's third-largest Ukrainian diaspora. Ukrainian Canadians represent the tenth-largest ethnic group in the country, with more than 1.2 million people of full or partial Ukrainian origin.¹⁵ The Ukrainian com-

Russia has been conducting a propaganda campaign targeted at the Russian diaspora and broader Canadian society.

11 But see Marina M. Doucerain, Catherine E. Amiot, and Andrew G. Ryder, 'Balancing out Bonding and Bridging Capital: Social Network Correlates of Multicultural Identity Configurations among Russian Migrants to Canada', *Self and Identity* 21.5 (2022): 527; Jenny Glozman and Susan S. Chuang, 'Identity and Belonging: The Role of the Mesosystem in the Adaptation of Russian-Speaking Immigrant Youth in Canada', *Conceptual and Methodological Approaches to Navigating Immigrant Ecologies* (2021): 47. This contrasts with research on Soviet-era migration to Canada and the history and cultural effects of Ukrainian migration to Canada. See Robert F. Barsky, 'Arguing the American Dream à la Canada: Former Soviet Citizens' Justification for their Choice of Host Country', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 8.2 (1995): 125; Tanya Basok, 'Soviet Immigration to Canada: The End of the Refugee Program?', *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research* 4.3-4 (1991): 513.

12 Anastasia Rogova, 'Protectors of the Great Victory: Commemoration of World War II in the Russian Community of Toronto', *Anthropologica* 64.1 (2022): 1.

13 Brian McQuinn, Marcus Kolga, Cody Buntain and Laura Courchesne, 'Russia Weaponization of Canada's Far Right and Far Left to Undermine Support for Ukraine', *International Journal*, 79(2) (2024): 297.

14 Stan Kutcher, Maria Popova, and Ian Garner, 'Russia's Propaganda Machine is Running Roughshod in Canada', *Policy OPTIONS*, 5 December 2024, <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/december-2024/russia-propaganda-canada/>.

15 Statistics Canada, 'Census Profile. 2021 Census of Population', 15 November 2023, <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2021/dp-pd/prof/details/page.cfm?LANG=E&GENDERLIST=1,2,3&STATISTICLIST=1,4&DGUIDLIST=2021A000011124&HEADERLIST=31,30&SearchText=Canada>.

munity mobilised extensively in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and began to cooperate more intensely with other Slavic groups, including people of Russian descent who oppose the actions of the Russian state.¹⁶

Brief historical overview

The history of migration from the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union to Canada spans over a century. In the 1870s, approximately 7,000 German Mennonites from Russia settled in Manitoba.¹⁷ Around the same time, Russian Jews began migrating to Montreal and Toronto, and in 1899, around 7,500 Doukhobors (Doukhobortsy or Spirit Wrestlers)—persecuted religious pacifists opposed to the tsarist government and the Orthodox Church—initially settled in Saskatchewan before moving to British Columbia.¹⁸

Following the 1917 Russian Revolution and the Civil War, about one million people emigrated from the Soviet Union to Canada. In the aftermath of World War II, Soviet emigration remained limited, with the exception of two significant waves of Jewish migration: from 1973 to 1980 and from 1988 to 1996. Motivated by economic factors and anti-Semitism,¹⁹ these migrants largely settled in Toronto, Montreal, and major cities in Western Canada.²⁰

Non-Jewish migration to Canada grew in the context of perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These migrants—among them many professionals, academics, and entrepreneurs—entered Canada through non-refugee channels focused on economic potential.²¹ Since 2001, just over 53,000 Russian-born individuals have been admitted to Canada. Two-thirds of them arrived as economic migrants under Canada's 'points system', which assesses potential newcomers based on their education, work experience, and language skills. The majority of the remaining newcomers were sponsored by family members already in Canada.²²

16 Natalia Goodwin, 'Why these Russians Living in Canada have Joined Protests Supporting Ukraine', CBC, 1 March 2022, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ottawa-ukraine-russia-protests-1.6367853>.

17 John Warkentin, 'The Mennonite Settlement of Southern Manitoba' (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1960, p. 2).

18 Adam Burke Carmichael, 'Problematic Settlers: Settler Colonialism and the Political History of the Doukhobors in Canada' (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Victoria, 2016).

19 Roberta L. Markus and Donald V. Schwartz, 'Soviet Jewish Émigrés in Toronto: Ethnic Self-Identity and Issues of Integration', *Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études Ethniques au Canada* 16.2 (1984): 71.

20 Robert J. Brym, 'Jewish Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Canada', *East European Jewish Affairs* 31.2 (2001): 34.

21 Charles Shahar, 'Canadian Jewish Population, 2020', in *American Jewish Year Book 2020: The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899*, edited by Arnolds Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheshkin (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 2022), p. 285.

22 Statistics Canada, 'Immigrant Population by Selected Places of Birth, Admission Category and Period of Immigration, 2021 Census', 20 October 2022, <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2021/dp-pd/dv-vd/imm/index-en.cfm>.

Multigenerational research design

The primary objective of the study is to deepen our understanding of Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background relative to the broader society. The multigenerational study includes a disproportionately high number of respondents with a connection to Russia.²³

For the purposes of this study, a (Soviet) Russian background is defined as:

- Parental generation: aged 35 or older. The respondent must have spent most of their formative years, specifically between the ages of 7 and 18, in (Soviet) Russia.
- Young adult generation: aged 18 to 34, socialisation took place primarily in Canada. The family must have relocated to Canada before the respondent was 11 years old, and at least one parent must fit the definition of the parental generation above.

Two members of the same family were invited to participate.

The research project furthermore aims to better understand family dynamics within both the population with a (Soviet) Russian background and the general Canadian population. For this reason, two members of the same family were invited to participate, one from the parental generation and one from the generation of young adults.

The survey of the general population was carried out using the Léger Opinion Panel (LEO), the largest panel in Canada, comprising over 500,000 members. Given the diversity of Canadian society, the general population has various cultural backgrounds: Nearly 90 per cent of the young respondents have Canadian-born parents, and nearly 8 per cent have one parent born in South Asia. To reach the population with a (Soviet) Russian background, Léger partnered with Decision Point Research, a company specialised in studying ethnic minorities in Canada. Respondents had the option of completing the survey in English, French or Russian, and it took them on average 25 minutes to complete it.²⁴ The survey was conducted from spring to early summer 2024.

The total sample includes 2,345 individuals, of whom 509 have a (Soviet) Russian background. As part of the survey, we collected 718 dyadic (parent-child) interviews—519 with families recruited from the general population and 199 with families from the population with a (Soviet) Russian background. The remaining interviews were with a representative of either the parental generation or the generation of young adults only.

The multigenerational focus group discussions were realised by Pivotal Research, again using Decision Point Research to recruit respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background. In a first round, groups comprised either members of the parental generation or the younger generation, and in a second round we mixed both generations. In total, we conducted discussions with

23 Félix Krawatzek and Hakob Matevosyan, 'Methodological Note on Canada', <https://osf.io/ymjxw>.

24 Two-thirds of the parents with a Russian background in our sample took the survey in Russian, compared to just 6 per cent of their children. Of the respondents recruited from the general population, 22 per cent took the survey in French, in line with Census data on the proportion of Canadians whose mother tongue is French.

16 groups with a (Soviet) Russian background and with 8 groups representing the general Canadian population, with a total of 62 unique participants. Group discussions with the parental generation from (Soviet) Russia were conducted in Russian, while all other focus groups took place in English. The first round of focus groups was with people residing in Ontario, notably the Greater Toronto Area, and a second round was with people from Alberta, notably Edmonton and Calgary.

Given that individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background are hard to reach, it is important to underline that the sample does not offer a strictly representative image of this population. Insights into this segment of the Canadian population based on such a sample may not capture the full range of perspectives or the popularity of specific viewpoints. Nevertheless, this data covers a wide range of respondents in both the survey and the focus groups and it reveals important tendencies in the views of this minority.

Findings

Political and social attitudes

Democracy and society

Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background are generally more sceptical about the principle of democracy than the general population. While positive perceptions of democracy outweigh negative ones across all groups, approval is lower among those with a (Soviet) Russian background (► FIGURE 1). There is also a generational divide over the extent to which democracy is a good form of government. Regardless of whether they have a migratory background or not, roughly one-third of younger respondents consider democracy a very good form of government. Yet only a quarter of the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background feel the same way, compared to half of the parental generation without a migratory background.

At the same time, younger individuals with a Russian background are the most likely to be critical of democracy. The daughter of a Russian father and a Russian-Canadian mother spoke to this generational divide:

‘I find older people here really believe more in democracy and that having seen all the history that they have actually had, like completely different leaders be in power and do completely different things. They saw more of it being effective. [...] I find old people really still believe in democracy a lot more and using it as a real power.’


female, 33 years, Alberta

Younger individuals with a Russian background are the most likely to be critical of democracy.

A 28-year-old focus group participant in Alberta further illustrates this critical stance among the young. Born in Russia, he arrived in Canada at the age of six and speaks about the economic success of friends back in Russia, suggesting that the authoritarian system was no barrier to that. In his words, the younger generation in Russia ‘just kind of want to live their life. [...] So as long as that system allows you to do that [...]’ He goes on to express his annoyance with democratic politicians in Canada, who ‘flip back and forth between what would get them the most popularity’ (male, 29 years, Alberta).

FIGURE 1

Leaving aside how well democracy functions in Canada, in your mind, democracy is a ...



Source: ZOIS survey, spring-summer 2024

There is a correlation between higher levels of education and favourable evaluations of the principle of democracy, particularly among first-generation migrants with a (Soviet) Russian background. Support for the Liberal Party of Canada, the governing party with a strong pro-immigration stance until 2024, is also a strong predictor of positive views of democracy, particularly among people with a (Soviet) Russian background. Interestingly, among second-generation Russian migrants, spoiling a vote or choosing not to vote is associated with more positive assessments of democracy. In this case, abstention does not necessarily reflect doubts about the principle of democracy as such.

The perceptions of people with a (Soviet) Russian background of the functioning of state institutions — such as the electoral system, government, police, and judiciary — are, however, largely indistinguishable from those of Canadians in general. The only exception is the police, which respondents with connections to Russia are more critical of than other Canadians. This contrasts with previous research that finds that first-generation migrants in Canada are generally more satisfied with the functioning of democracy and the country's major institutions than the overall population, while only

the second generation is more sceptical and aligns more closely with the national average.²⁵

Our survey finds significantly higher rates of abstention among respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background compared to their age peers in the general population.²⁶ The Russian parents are, however, more likely than their offspring to participate in national and provincial elections. Focus group discussions further illustrate how some individuals with a Russian background have withdrawn from Canadian democracy. A woman from Calgary claims that ‘We have elections formally, but in fact they are prearranged’ (female, 44 years, Alberta). Another participant with a Russian background from Toronto explains how she would prefer to leave decision-making to politicians instead of being involved in decision-making across various political levels:

Some individuals with a Russian background have withdrawn from Canadian democracy.

‘I can do without municipal elections or stuff like this. [...] Because if you have a party in power that is democratically elected [...] that can manage the country [...] they can appoint the mayors, they can appoint the judges. I don’t care. I will just vote for you in the federal election and you keep the country rolling.’

female, 21 years, Ontario

About one-third of Russian respondents aged 35 and older report that they usually participate in Russian state elections, another third do not, while the remaining respondents are either not eligible or chose not to respond. As one explanation for their abstention, focus group participants referred to their belief that elections in Russia are ‘rigged’. Among the younger respondents, half are ineligible to vote, and only a very small fraction of the rest participates in Russian elections. According to the results of the Central Election Commission for the 2024 Russian presidential election, more than 50 per cent of Russian Canadians voted for the Russian president, a finding corroborated by independent exit polls.²⁷

Following Justin Trudeau’s resignation in January 2025 and Mark Carney’s win to lead the Liberal Party in March 2025, questions about party support and voter realignment have become more pressing. Among respondents with (Soviet) Russian roots, one-third would vote for Poilievre’s Conservative Party, largely in line with the level of the party’s support in the general population (► FIGURE 2). A key difference emerges with regard to Trudeau’s Liberal Party of Canada, as more than one-third of the older generation with a (Soviet) Russian background supports them, compared to one-fifth of their counterparts in the general population. Young people are in general less supportive of the Liberals than their parents, and a clear majority of them supports the Conservatives.


25 Nicole Jarrett and Andrew Parkin, ‘The Perspectives of Second-Generation Immigrants in Canada’, Environics Institute, 7 November 2024, p. 17–18, <https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/the-perspectives-of-second-generation-immigrants-in-canada1>. See also Statistics Canada, ‘Confidence in Canadian Institutions’, 14 November 2023, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2023057-eng.htm>.

26 Statistics show that other naturalised Canadians are also more likely than the non-migrant Canadian population to abstain from voting: Statistics Canada, ‘Voter Turnout Rates by Age Group, Province and Immigrant Status, 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections’, 16 February 2022, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/220216/t001d-eng.htm>.

27 Vote Abroad, ‘Exit Polls Results Outside Of Russia from Russian Presidential Election’, 17 March 2024, <https://voteabroad.info/>.

FIGURE 2

If the federal elections took place today, for which party would you probably vote?



Source: ZOiS survey, spring-summer 2024

When it comes to civic engagement, there are notable differences between the general population and individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background. One-third of younger respondents with Russian roots reported not engaging in any kind of social or political activities during the past year. While they were the most likely group to have commented on politics on social media, they discuss politics with friends or participate in community services far less frequently than their age peers in the overall population. In contrast, the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background is more likely to have made donations to Russian organisations in Canada or in Russia itself. Yet remarkably, unlike the national reference population, this group is not

involved to any meaningful extent in aiding Ukrainian refugees. The few who have become involved in this area cite the shared language as a reason for their engagement. A young woman from Toronto said she was motivated to support Ukrainian refugees ‘because a lot of them do also speak Russian’ (female, 19 years, Ontario).

Russia’s war against Ukraine

Canada ranks among the top ten countries in terms of overall aid granted to Ukraine.²⁸ Public support for providing weapons and financial assistance has remained high, and in February 2024 a majority of Canadians continued to be in favour of providing military aid to Ukraine, although opinions varied on its scale. Approximately 25 per cent of Canadians believed Canada should increase its humanitarian aid and 25 per cent advocated for more military supplies—up from 20 per cent in October 2023.²⁹ At the same time, one-third of Canadians think that financial aid to Ukraine should decrease, a higher proportion than at earlier points in the war.³⁰

To assess public perceptions of the war and its implications, we focus on three dimensions (► FIGURE 3):

Views on Russia’s responsibility for the war in Ukraine differ starkly between respondents with and without a (Soviet) Russian background. More than two-thirds of the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background do not think that Russia is solely responsible for the war. This is also the group with the lowest number of ‘don’t knows’ with regard to this question. Along similar lines, more than half of the second generation with a (Soviet) Russian background disagrees that Russia is solely responsible, although one in ten remain uncertain.

Individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background are also more likely than the general population to agree that the war protects Russia’s legitimate political interests. A majority of the parental generation agrees with this statement, while the second generation is more divided. Over 10 per cent of younger people with Russian roots avoid taking sides. The divergence from the broader Canadian population, where only around 20 per cent think the war protects Russia’s legitimate political interests, is significant.

Respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background tend to support the official Russian position that Russia should counterbalance Western powers in international politics. Three-quarters of the parental generation agree with this view, compared to 55 per cent of their offspring. Here too, the younger generation is more uncertain, with one in ten undecided. By contrast, only one in five people in the general population agree that Russia should act as a counterweight to Western powers.




Respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background are more likely to agree that the war protects Russia’s legitimate political interests.

28 Pietro Bompreszi, Giuseppe Irto, Ivan Kharitonov, Taro Nishikawa, and Christoph Trebesch, ‘Ukraine Support Tracker: A Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine’, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/>.

29 Léger, ‘Ukraine-Russia Conflict : 2 Years Later’, 22 February 2024, <https://leger360.com/ukraine-russia-conflict-2-years-later/>.

30 Sean Boynton, ‘More Canadians Want Ukraine to Keep Fighting than Seek Deal — But Not by Much: Poll’, Global News, 6 February 2024, <https://globalnews.ca/news/10276676/ukraine-russia-war-poll-canada-2024/>.

FIGURE 3

"Only Russia is responsible for the escalation of war in Ukraine."***"Russia's war against Ukraine is a means of protecting its legitimate political interests."******"It is important that Russia counterbalances Western powers in international politics."***

Source: ZOIS survey, spring-summer 2024

Across all three questions, there is a tendency for male respondents, younger people, and those who are better off to have views similar to those propagated by the Kremlin.

In the focus groups with people with a (Soviet) Russian background, some participants refer to the differences they see between those who arrived in Canada as children and those who came as adults. As a 38-year-old daughter of two Russians living in Alberta states:

‘I think it depends on their age because I moved to Canada when I was 14. My friends moved when they were 19 and I find them a bit different. [...] In terms of politics, I find them being more positive about the Putin regime, which I’m quite negative about. [...] They also think that the war in Ukraine is awesome and it’s protecting us from Nazism and things like that. So we don’t necessarily agree, and I feel like they have an absolutely different perspective and I’m just wondering if maybe that’s because they lived most of their life in [Russia].’

Market liberal and socially conservative

Respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background are less likely to criticise socio-economic inequality. To a greater extent than the general population, they attribute poverty to insufficient personal commitment, possibly speaking to their own reliance on hard work rather than family heritage for upward mobility.³¹ Our survey shows that parents and children in families with a (Soviet) Russian background are more likely to agree on economic matters than their counterparts in the national reference population, where we found a greater diversity of opinion among parents and children. Indeed, a sense of disillusionment with Canada’s economic system is particularly strong among some younger Canadians, who believe that economic disparities are too pronounced and that poverty is not the result of personal shortcomings. The soaring cost of living is one of the issues that contributed to Prime Minister Trudeau’s resignation in early January 2025.

On average, respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background are, irrespective of age, more likely to see newcomers as a threat to the Canadian way of life. At the same time, reflecting on their own economic integration, many also believe that migrants make a positive contribution to the Canadian economy. The general population has more polarised views, particularly regarding the cultural impact of newcomers. Here, political affiliation is the strongest predictor of such attitudes. Unlike Liberal Party of Canada and New Democratic Party voters, Conservative and Bloc Québécois voters tend to perceive newcomers as a threat. Men are also more likely to hold this view. A focus group participant from Ontario refers to the mixed feelings she and others have about the profound changes migration has brought to her neighbourhood. Alongside goodwill and the joy of learning about new cultures, such fast demographic change also gives rise to animosity and concerns about housing and the composition of schools (female, 60 years, Ontario).

Respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background are more likely to see newcomers as a threat to the Canadian way of life.

31 When asked for their opinion on the statement ‘Poverty is primarily the result of a lack of personal commitment’, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) individuals with a (Soviet) Russian background scored an average of more than 6 across both generations. In contrast, the general population scored an average of below 5.

On the question of what qualifies as ‘normal’ today in terms of gender identity, respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background differ markedly from the Canadian reference population. We asked our respondents whether men should have the freedom to wear dresses, makeup, and nail polish. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), first-generation (Soviet) Russian migrants scored an average of just over 3, compared to an average of nearly 7 among other Canadians aged 35 and older. The younger generation with a (Soviet) Russian background scored an average of slightly over 5, whereas their age peers in the general Canadian population scored over 7. While the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background is very divided on this issue, it is not as polarising for their offspring.

Canada was the first country in the world to include a question on non-binary sexual identity in its census.³² According to official statistics, of the nearly 30.5 million people in Canada aged 15 and older in May 2021, 0.33 per cent were non-binary. More than half of respondents from the national reference population state that they would be willing to accept such a person—on a 10-point scale they score upwards of 7 on average. The reverse holds for people with a Russian background, where more than two-thirds of respondents aged 35 and older score 3 or lower. Younger respondents with a Russian background score 4 on average. While there is broad agreement on this question among the general Canadian population, our survey finds that gender issues remain deeply divisive for respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background.

Views on history

When we asked respondents about historical events that make them proud or ashamed to be Canadians, we found a striking absence of a centre of gravity when it comes to moments of historical pride and a convergence when it comes to historical shame. The dispersed moments of pride across the population with and without a (Soviet) Russian background include Canada’s involvement in World War I and World War II, alongside Canada’s commitment to guaranteed rights and freedoms, exemplified by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and progress in the area of LGBTQ+ rights, women’s equality, and anti-discrimination. Conversely, when asked about shame, a majority of respondents mentions the persecution of Indigenous peoples, in particular the enduring legacy of residential schools, systemic land dispossession, and colonial exploitation.

The fragmented historical pride is also a reflection of Canadian multiculturalism. In the absence of a single cohesive historical narrative, a more decentralised mnemonic landscape has emerged with different ways of engaging or ignoring history. While this openness allows multiple perspectives to coexist, it also makes it easier for historical disinformation to circulate. Nevertheless, both central and provincial governments have tried to achieve some ‘mnemonic integration’, for instance with regard to Canada’s 150th anniversary in 2017 or the centenary of World War I. An initiative of the government of

The fragmented historical pride is also a reflection of Canadian multiculturalism.

32 Statistics Canada, ‘Canada Is the First Country to Provide Census Data on Transgender and Non-binary People’, 27 April 2022, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/220427/dq220427b-eng.htm>.

Ontario is noteworthy: From September 2025 onwards, Holodomor education will be mandatory in the Grade 10 Canadian History course.³³

The central holiday in the Russian mnemonic calendar is 9 May or Victory Day, which marks the end of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ in Russia and other post-Soviet states. Most Russians in Russia associate Victory Day primarily with the ‘destruction of the Hitler regime’ followed by the ‘liberation of European countries from Nazi occupation’.³⁴ Our survey finds that this memory differs among Russian Canadians. Although the victory over Nazi Germany is the most frequent association with 9 May, only about one in five Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background cite it. The memory of war victims, the multi-ethnic composition of the Red Army, and the joint efforts by the USSR and its Western allies also feature prominently, each mentioned by around 15 per cent of the respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background.

The death of more than six million Jews out of a pre-war European Jewish population of 9.5 million people is a defining element of cosmopolitan memory after World War II. This memory is, however, contingent on an awareness of the scale of this mass murder and the historical continuities of the Holocaust with, for instance, colonial violence. Our survey shows the extent to which young respondents with a Russian background cannot relate to that event. Indeed, when asked how many people perished, nearly a quarter indicate that it was either a ‘small fraction’ or that ‘nobody really knows’, as opposed to just 8 per cent of first-generation migrants with a (Soviet) Russian background and about 15 per cent of the Canadian reference population with similar views. The high level of awareness among the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background is consistent with the Soviet-era emphasis on Nazi atrocities. In contrast, the older generation in the general population is more likely to hold views that are potentially denialist or minimise the violence of the Holocaust.

The liberation of the Auschwitz death camp on 27 January 1945 by Red Army soldiers has emerged as a central episode in the remembrance of World War II in post-Soviet Russia. Coincidentally, the Siege of Leningrad ended on the same day in 1944, and in recent Russian war memory the two events—Holocaust and Siege—reinforce one another in a combined narrative of the ‘genocide against the peoples of the Soviet Union’ and the liberation of Europe from fascism. Awareness of the Red Army’s role in liberating Auschwitz is low across Western countries, highlighting a divergence in historical memory between Russia and the West. When asked who liberated Auschwitz, nearly all Soviet-born Russian respondents and 90 per cent of their offspring mentioned the Red Army. This knowledge is not widespread among the general population: Only slightly over a quarter of respondents mentioned the Red Army, with a similar share admitting they did not know who liberated Auschwitz, and about 20 per cent mistakenly attributing the liberation to the United States.

33 News Ontario, ‘Ontario to Make Holodomor Education Mandatory for High School Students’, 28 November 2023, <https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/1003893/ontario-to-make-holodomor-education-mandatory-for-high-school-students>.

34 Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения (ВЦИОМ), ‘День Победы — 2023’, 4 May 2023, <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/den-pobedy-2023>. See also Левада-Центр, ‘День Победы’, 5 August 2020, <https://www.levada.ru/2020/05/08/den-pobedy-4/>.

Even Canadians who were socialised in Soviet Russia tend not to be nostalgic about the Soviet Union.

Associations with the Soviet Union

In today's Russia the Soviet Union continues to evoke overwhelmingly positive sentiments. It is most commonly associated with 'faith in a bright future', followed by 'positive emotions' and the notion of a 'multinational state'.³⁵

Unlike their peers in Russia, even Canadians who were socialised in Soviet Russia tend not to be nostalgic about the Soviet Union. As our research shows, 'friendship of the peoples', a key positive association with the Soviet era in Russian society, holds little significance for Russian migrants in Canada (► FIGURE 4). Russian Canadians also place no great value on other qualities often attributed by Russians in Russia to that period of history: economic stability and social justice. The lack of positive associations is even more pronounced among other Canadians, who emphasise the lack of political choice and economic freedoms. This is the view of the Soviet Union that emerges most strongly in the focus groups. Tellingly, one participant mentions that his family came from the Soviet Union, which was 'not a fun place to live', and criticises people back in Russia for being nostalgic while his assessment of that period is overwhelmingly negative (male, 52 years, Alberta).

Emotions and history

Mentions of Canada's involvement in World War II trigger different emotions in Canadians with and without a (Soviet) Russian background. Among the latter, hope and pride prevail, while respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background are more likely to feel indifference. This is important when we consider the issue of their deeper emotional belonging to Canadian society. While Canadians of (Soviet) Russian origin embrace Canadian traditions, entering into the history-based realm of the social contract remains more difficult. This may also be symptomatic of the weak extent to which Canadian national identity is based on history.

The persecution of Indigenous peoples is an emotive topic that has received greater attention from Canadian governments since the early 1970s. In general, newcomers tend to have more negative views of Indigenous people. The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2015) underscores that newcomers may bring their own traumatic experiences, which affect their interactions with Indigenous communities.³⁶ Even if the issue of Indigenous people is an important part of citizenship education for newcomers, our survey data confirms how difficult it is to pass on deeper normative commitments to migrant groups. For respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, recognition of the suffering of Indigenous people is not something they consider essential to being part of Canadian society. This contrasts with the broad consensus on this issue among respondents in the national reference population.


35 Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения (ВЦИОМ), 'Тридцать лет спустя, или вспоминая и забывая СССР', 6 December 2021, <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/tridcat-let-spustja-ili-vspominaja-i-zabyvaja-sssr>.

36 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 'Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future', 2015, https://ehprnh2mwo3.exactdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Executive_Summary_English_Web.pdf. See also Rebecca Kuropatwa, 'The Connection between Immigrants and Aboriginal People in Canada's Mosaic', 16 December 2015, <https://canadianimmigrant.ca/living/community/the-connection-between-immigrants-and-aboriginal-people-in-canadas-mosaic>.

FIGURE 4

What do you associate with the period between 1953, Stalin's death, to 1985, when Gorbachev came to power? (Russian background) /

What associations come to mind with the Soviet Union? (general population)



Source: ZOIS survey, spring-summer 2024

Speaking to the general lack of emotion that history arouses in them, respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background are also unlikely to feel anger when Canadians speak negatively about Soviet-Russian history. Fewer than 10 per cent of older respondents and an even smaller share of younger respondents say they would definitely feel angry. In fact, 20 per cent of respondents with a Russian background explicitly state that they do not feel angry at all in such situations. Similarly, Canadians in general are not particularly defensive about history. Among older respondents in the general population, just over 20 per cent report feeling angry when other Canadians speak negatively about Canadian history, with even fewer younger respondents admitting to feeling the same.

Transnational connections

Activities of Russian-speaking people in Canada

Families with a (Soviet) Russian background in Canada consider traditions from their country of origin important. More than 80 per cent of older respondents and over 50 per cent of younger respondents say that such traditions are somewhat or very important. This mirrors the views of other Canadians with a migratory background on their respective traditions. Several focus group participants mention hybrid cultural practices:

‘We do two Christmases in my household, so one in December and then one later in January, like Orthodox Christmas.’

female, 25, Alberta

Other participants in Toronto and Alberta talk about how they sing Russian songs, eat Russian food and read Russian literature, particularly on major holidays.

For younger respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, Canadian traditions are more important than Russian ones: Nearly 90 per cent state that they are somewhat or very important, similar to the share of the overall Canadian population that values Canadian traditions. They also matter to the parental generation with a Russian background: Around 70 per cent of these respondents indicate that they consider them somewhat or very important. These figures highlight one area where Canadian multiculturalism has been successful. Newcomers identify strongly with a loose notion of Canada, and the second generation is similar to the broader reference population in this regard. Symbols such as the flag or the national anthem are considered more important among migrants than non-migrants, and the same applies to the official commitment to multiculturalism.³⁷

Attendance of cultural, sports or youth events with co-nationals is an indicator of connectedness within the (Soviet) Russian community. Almost 40 per cent of the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background say they participate at least occasionally in such events — a value that is only marginally higher among other ethnic minorities in Canada. Among the younger generation, about one-third attend these events occasionally, irrespective of their migration background.

For younger respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, Canadian traditions are more important than Russian ones.


³⁷ Environics Institute, ‘The Evolution of the Canadian Identity’, 22 December 2022, p. 12, <https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/the-evolution-of-the-canadian-identity>.

Links to Russia

Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background are largely disconnected from Russia. Younger individuals in particular have either cut ties or never had them to begin with (► FIGURE 5). They are far less likely than young people with other migratory backgrounds to have immediate family members or friends in the ancestral homeland (under 10 per cent). Among the older respondents, approximately one-third have immediate family members or friends in their country of origin, similar to people with other migratory backgrounds. A similar share in both generations, about one-third, still has connections to more distant relatives in Russia.

FIGURE 5

What connections do you have in Russia? (Russian background) /
What connections do you have in your home country? (other migratory background)



Source: ZOIS survey, spring-summer 2024

The lower overall density of ties to Russia is also reflected in a reduced frequency of contacts with friends and family members, even among those who report maintaining connections. This trend sets Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background apart from Canada's non-Russian migrant population. Only a small fraction of people with a (Soviet) Russian background are in regular contact with family members in Russia—slightly over 20 per cent of the older generation and less than 10 per cent of the younger generation. In contrast, nearly three-quarters of other migrant respondents maintain such regular communication with family members in their country of origin.

Travel to Russia is also rare. More than 80 per cent of the young adults with a Russian background mention that they have not visited Russia in the last five years. The same is true for half of the older respondents. Of those who have travelled to Russia, visits were usually short, no longer than three months. The picture looks very different for other minorities, where only one-third has not returned to their country of origin in the last five years.

Relevance of language


To better understand how Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background relate to other Russian speakers, we asked how important it would be for respondents to speak with someone in Russian in various situations (► **FIGURE 6**). Both generations with a (Soviet) Russian background would have no particular desire to speak with someone with a Russian-language background in several different contexts. For example, when looking for a new job or seeking medical help, around 20 per cent of the parental generation and slightly more than 40 per cent of the second generation consider this to be completely irrelevant. The situation is slightly different when it comes to talking about personal matters or political issues. More than 50 per cent of the parental generation and 20 per cent of the second generation think it is somewhat or very important to turn to fellow Russian speakers when discussing politics.

We identified a significant generational shift when it comes to language use among Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background (► **FIGURE 7**). Three-quarters of older respondents report speaking Russian with their children. However, communication between siblings in the second generation is more likely to be in English. The shift towards English is even more pronounced in the case of partners. While most older respondents speak Russian with their partners, this is the exception to the rule among respondents from the second generation. Russian is also not commonly used in professional settings.


FIGURE 6

Thinking about the following situations, how important is it for you to turn to a fellow Russian-speaker in Canada?


A Discussing politics



B Getting a new job



C Finding a medical doctor





■ Parental generation (Russian background)
■ Young adults (Russian background)

n = 509

Source: ZOIS survey, spring-summer 2024

FIGURE 7

What language do you normally speak with ...



■ English
■ French
■ Russian

Source: ZOIS survey, spring-summer 2024

Russian parents and their offspring reported significantly more frequent political discussions than the other Canadians surveyed.


Intergenerational transmission

Discussing politics within the family and with peers

Political discussions at home are critical for the transmission of political ideals. We asked respondents to assess the frequency of political discussions at home when their child (for the parental generation) or they themselves (for the young adult generation) were 14 years old. On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates that political discussions never occurred and 10 indicates that they occurred very frequently, Russian parents and their offspring reported significantly more frequent discussions (average score well above five) than the other Canadians surveyed (average score well below five). Furthermore, approximately 20 per cent of non-Russian Canadians in each generation reported never discussing politics, a figure that is only half as high among those with a (Soviet) Russian background.

When our respondents were asked with whom they were most likely to have discussed politics with at the age of 14, the dominant influence of fathers becomes clear, in particular among respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background (► FIGURE 8). Nearly three-quarters of these respondents indicate that they mainly discussed politics with their fathers, while around one-fifth did so with their mothers. When asked about the second-most likely person they discussed politics with, more than half of the respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background mention their mothers. Among non-Russian Canadians, siblings and friends played an important role in political discussions, but this was not the case for respondents with a Russian background.

FIGURE 8
With whom were you first most likely to talk about politics when you were about 14?



Source: ZOIS survey, spring-summer 2024

Agreement within the family, disagreement among friends

When asked about the extent to which the generations agree on political matters, the parental generation with a (Soviet) Russian background perceives a higher degree of cross-generational agreement than other respondents do. This minority is also more likely to talk about politics in the first place. Nearly 20 per cent of the older respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background say their child always agrees with their political views, compared to 7 per cent of parents in the general population. However, when the younger generation with a Russian background is asked the same question, only just over one in ten say they always agree with their fathers, while levels of agreement with mothers are slightly lower (7 per cent). In the general population, younger people tend to agree more often with their parents: 15 per cent with their mothers and 11 per cent with their fathers.

The family is a relatively harmonious space for political debate. In contrast, young respondents—especially those with a Russian background—are more likely than their parents to disagree with friends on political matters. And those with a (Soviet) Russian background also mention political disagreement with colleagues more frequently than respondents from the national reference population.

Younger respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background also recall a greater diversity of political opinions among their childhood friends in Canada. Around one-third report disagreements most of the time or always, compared to just 15 per cent of respondents from the national reference population. This difference speaks to the diversity of political perspectives within migrant communities and the fact that migrant families are more likely to bring distinct political views that deviate from those that prevail in the host society.

When asked where they get their historical knowledge from, a remarkable split becomes apparent between respondents with and without a (Soviet) Russian background. For approximately one-third of the latter, particularly younger respondents, school is the primary source. Yet this is the case for only just over 10 per cent of respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background. For older respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background, parents and family documents are the most frequently mentioned sources. Younger respondents with a Russian background, meanwhile, turn to social media, with about one-third identifying it as their main source.

School is the primary source of historical knowledge for only 10% of respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background.

The opinions that we identify in this report suggest that they have been influenced to a certain degree by Russia's efforts.

Conclusions

The (Soviet) Russian community in Canada is well integrated in socio-economic terms, as our data also underlines. However, there are several areas where a socio-cultural integration has not occurred. To some extent, this is a reflection of Canada's Multiculturalism Act, which provides for the 'full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins' while preserving their cultural heritage.³⁸ As well as reflecting a legacy of Soviet communism which persists over time, the opinions that we identify in this report among people with a (Soviet) Russian background suggest that they have been influenced to a certain degree by Russia's efforts to shape the hearts and minds of its 'compatriots' across the globe.

The extent to which Canadians with and without a (Soviet) Russian background differ in their opinions on the war in Ukraine is particularly striking. More often than not, the views of the war espoused by Canadians with a (Soviet) Russian background align with the Kremlin's position. In addition, our research reveals that this group tends to have lower trust in the principle of democracy and also vote less frequently, in particular the second generation.

An appeal to history, which is so central to the Kremlin's attempts to justify the war in Ukraine and to rally the Russian diaspora community, may well fail in the case of Russian-Canadians, since Soviet history, as our research shows, is not emotionally charged for them. By and large, the historical narratives used by the Kremlin to shape the opinions of this community in Canada do not resonate. At the same time, the relatively modest Canadian government initiatives towards the mnemonic integration of Canadian society do open up spaces for historical disinformation and propaganda to circulate.

Although Canadians with Russian roots maintain certain cultural traditions and occasionally participate in Russian-centred events, there is a marked shift towards Canadian cultural practices, especially among the younger generation. Furthermore, the data reveal a notable disconnection from Russia, particularly among younger individuals. Communications with people in the ancestral homeland are infrequent and visits to Russia rare. Language use further illustrates this trend, with English becoming dominant in the personal and professional lives of the second generation. This disconnect further evidences the limited success of Russia's attempts to influence its diaspora community in Canada.

Canadians head to the polls in late April following a snap election called by the new Prime Minister Mark Carney, the former governor of the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England. The election takes place as the country's political landscape has shifted dramatically with the return of Donald Trump to the White House. Rising tensions between the two countries have brought Canada's relationship with the United States to the centre of voters' attention. Irrespective of controversies over domestic politics, the election outcome will be determined by who has the stronger and more credible message to confront the international political climate created by the U.S. president.

38 On the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 3 June 2024, see: <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/about-multiculturalism-anti-racism/about-act.html>.

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Basement of a Russian Orthodox Church in Toronto
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