The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia Since February 2022

While estimates vary, Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted approximately 800,000 to 900,000 Russian citizens to leave their country. Two distinct waves of migration from Russia have been identified: the first in the spring and summer of 2022, the second after the announcement of a partial mobilisation in September 2022. A significant number of Russian migrants have since returned to Russia, and it is estimated that 650,000 remain abroad. This report focuses on five of the most important destination countries for new Russian migration: Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. We conducted face-to-face interviews with around 4,300 Russian citizens across the five countries in the summer of 2023. The aim was to get a clearer sense of their political attitudes and determine whether different countries were popular with particular categories of migrants. For each of the five countries, we can demonstrate a correlation between the migrants’ socio-demographic profile and their political views, in particular their position on Russia’s war against Ukraine. These are our main findings:

• Migrants who left Russia since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 represent a highly heterogeneous group within and across the host countries. They differ strongly in their views on Russian politics and Russia’s war against Ukraine and in their political behaviour and social values. Given this diversity, it seems unlikely that the migrants will unite around a new overarching idea of Russians abroad. A shared sense of identity may, however, emerge linked to specific locations and experiences.
• Different countries seem to attract specific socio-economic segments, with marked differences in the migrants’ age, level of education, employment sector, and previous place of residence in Russia. Our samples in Armenia and Georgia pick up a younger, highly educated, urban segment with a large number of employees from the IT sector. The samples in Kyrgyzstan and Turkey are much more diverse, and the sample in Kazakhstan includes migrants with lower levels of education and a large share of people working in the construction and trade sectors.
• Across the five countries, the new Russian migrants cannot be thought of as an opposition-in-exile in the making. Armenia and Georgia emerge as the countries in our sample where a significant share of Russian migrants reports oppositional views and previous experience of political mobilisation in Russia. However, the societal and political context in Georgia, where Russians are viewed with suspicion, limits their scope for local or transnational political action. For the time being, this atmosphere seems to be having a demobilising effect. By contrast, Armenia currently appears to be a more conducive setting for political actions directed at Russia.
• Sizeable shares of the migrant population in Turkey and Kazakhstan are broadly aligned with the political ideas propagated by the Kremlin, whereas the data from Kyrgyzstan suggest significant diversity and the potential for criticism of Russian politics. – Russian migrants are a key target of the Kremlin’s propaganda and many are still immersed in the Russian media environment. Under these circumstances it would be wise to invest more in alternative Russian-language media and support efforts to forge connections between migrants in different countries.