Online Lives between Germany and Russia
Russia’s war against Ukraine is being waged in parallel as an information war in the digital space. The Kremlin uses social media as a foreign policy tool in order to influence public opinion abroad. The online space between Germany and Russia often presents conflicting world views.
When our history lessons turned to the topic of the Red Army’s rapes of German women, I felt compelled to start a discussion. I suggested that we should be talking about the concentration camps; at least the Russians didn’t strip off anyone’s skin in order to turn it into lampshades. I defended my supposed homeland, which I could barely remember, performing a balancing act between two forms of not-being; being Russian and being German – neither applied to me and nor, in my opinion, could I speak either language, German or Russian, terribly well.
Passage from the novel 153 Formen des Nichtseins [153 Forms of Not-Being], in which Slata Roschal describes what it means to become aware of one’s own identity between two languages and countries of origin (own translation).
Translated from the German by Hillary Crowe.
Social media act as a catalyst for disinformation and propaganda. At the same time, they also offer a platform where users can share information, debunk fake news and form solidarity networks. German-Russian influencers adopt a position between their two countries’ conflicting attitudes towards history, society and the world order. While some of these influencers reproduce state narratives, others take an ambivalent or critical stance. Young social media users with a Russian background or family history or who are multilingual may feel connected to both countries, or alienated from them, or they may be somewhere in-between.
In March 2023, the Kremlin issued a new Concept for its foreign policy. One of the strategy paper’s central elements concerns so-called compatriots living abroad; the geopolitical doctrine of the ‘Russian world’ (‘russkiy mir’) plays a key role in this context. Russians are defined as all persons who adopt a pro-Russian position in alignment with the Kremlin’s policies. They must be protected and their all-Russian cultural identity preserved. These conceptionsmake them a focal point for the systematic dissemination of spurious historical justifications for Russia’s place in the world, based on its contribution to the victory in World War II and what is claimed to be its ensuing task of safeguarding a world order in line with Russian interests. In contrast, opponents of the regime and deserters are portrayed as traitors to their homeland.
Studies show that the information flowing into Germany from the post-Soviet region promotes anti-liberal and anti-Western positions. Right-wing and far-right alternative media in Germany frequently adopt the Kremlin’s narratives and target an audience that is receptive to Russian state discourses. This content is taken up by social media channels in Germany that are close to the Kremlin.
Pro-Kremlin actors in the German-Russian social media space
In the social networks in Germany (Telegram, YouTube, TikTok and Instagram), the same faces who disseminate Russian state narratives are encountered again and again. Some of the individuals behind the accounts have family ties to Russia or a history of migration to or from Russia; some are pro-Kremlin political activists. They often use their accounts to share content from alternative media which promote far-right messages or conspiracy theories and which, in some cases, are funded by sources close to the Kremlin.
The perceived ‘anti-Russian’ mood and activities in Germany are a common thread across these accounts. Pro-Kremlin influencers counter this alleged hostility by drawing attention to Russia’s supposed historical position in the world. They respond with mockery and derision to the German government, its domestic policies or its position on Russia’s war against Ukraine. The clown emoji is often used as a stylistic device to ridicule posts from the established media or statements by German politicians. In addition, they often spread conflicting viewpoints that have supposedly been ‘hushed up’ by the ‘mainstream’ media. In parallel to these ‘alternative’ news outlets, TikTok in particular hosts a group of German anti-government influencers; some of them have roots in Russia and some do not, but driven by rage and incomprehension at German politics and social values, all of them have emigrated to Russia in order to live in ‘freedom’ there. They too pour scorn on German democracy and consider the Russian regime to be misunderstood or unfairly depicted.
From cultural identity to political activism
Not all the pro-Kremlin voices focus solely on politics. In Germany, for example, a young female singer with a Russian background and a large number of followers on TikTok and Instagram produces content whose main topics are music and travel. In her bilingual songs and posts, she often talks about her Slavic roots. She blends Russian folk with German rap, writes songs about friendship between the two countries, and celebrates her cultural background by showcasing Russian customs, clothing and food. In doing so, she reproduces Russian traditional values in a subtle and nuanced way. In some posts, she reacts to critical comments by making statements that reflect far more obvious pro-Kremlin ideologies. In her content, she acknowledges the view of history, politics and society that she grew up with in German schools but clearly rejects it for herself.
By contrast, an ethnic German singer from Russia has adopted a clear position against the war; in her lyrics and posts, she explores issues such as mental health and depression in order to counter the taboos surrounding these topics, particularly in Slavic families. Another TikToker talks openly about how she deals with the family trauma endured by her parents under Soviet repression. Stereotypical gender roles within her family are also a topic of her videos. Several other accounts focus on ethnic Germans from Russia (Spätaussiedler) and repatriates of German ancestry, foregrounding their culture, history and community. They adopt a clear position against Russia’s war on Ukraine and reflect on their own role in the context of Russian politics.
Members of the political opposition from Russia who are active on social media prefer to rely on Instagram and Telegram. Aligning themselves with the late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, they call for protests and share gruesome images of Russian attacks on Ukraine. In terms of their reach, however, they lag far behind the pro-Kremlin influencers and propagandists. This may be a consequence of resource inequality or the lack of a collective organisation – but it may also bear witness to a struggle for identity and the search for a clear position amidst the contradictions and difficulties of actively opposing one’s own country.
Complex offers of identity for youth between Germany and Russia
Social media have considerable reach among youths and young adults and strongly influence their self-image and values. It can be particularly challenging for young German-Russian binationals to adopt a position, for their connection to their heritage or homeland is often experienced solely online. They encounter complex offers of identity which are often difficult to reconcile and may result in feelings of exclusion in Germany. In order to prevent young people in Germany with ties to Russia from feeling alienated from society and falling prey to pro-Kremlin disinformation and fake news, it is important to address the challenges of their lives at the interface between two often conflicting worldviews. Key policy instruments should include efforts to consistently address and sanction war-related propaganda and curb the flow of funding from sources close to the Kremlin. Prebunking and awareness-raising to protect against disinformation can also de-energise pro-Kremlin discourses. And crucially, Germany’s mainstream society must advocate for inclusion and promote a sense of belonging among young people with a Russian background.
Sophia Winkler is a researcher at ZOiS and is undertaking doctoral research on social media and young Russians’ identity abroad. Her project is part of the ERC-funded project Moving Russia(ns): Intergenerational Transmission of Memories Abroad and at Home (MoveMeRU).
External partner: Professor Florian Töpfl, Chair of Political Communication with a Focus on Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Region, University of Passau.