Old Autocrat, New Society: What to Expect from the Presidential Election in Belarus

The presidential election in Belarus on 26 January is taking place in a complex geopolitical context. Since the quashing of the protests following the last election in 2020, the Belarusian regime’s reliance on Russia has resulted in critical levels of political, economic, military, and cultural influence, undermining Belarus’s sovereignty. This dependence has led Belarus to provide its territory, along with military and civilian infrastructure, for Russian attacks against Ukraine.

At the same time, the country has been the target of the most severe Western sanctions in its history, introduced in several waves following the brutal crackdown on the 2020 protests, the forced landing of a Ryanair flight in Minsk to arrest an opposition activist, the migration crisis induced at the EU border, as well as support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Despite unprecedented and prolonged protests, Alexander Lukashenka managed to retain power in 2020 due to the consolidation of the security apparatus and administrative elite, as well as Russian support. However, he lost much of his domestic and international legitimacy. For the autocrat, the upcoming election is an opportunity to restore that.

Stale ideas and never-ending repressions

The current presidential electoral campaign is very different from the last: There are no independent candidates, no lively public debates, no big promises by the incumbent and no visible civic unrest. Apart from Lukashenka himself, there are four registered candidates. Three represent pro-government parties and are merely token candidates. Even the formally independent Hanna Kanapackaya, who was ‘appointed’ to serve as an opposition MP from 2016 to 2019, does not change the overall picture.

The pro-government narratives circulating in the run-up to the election rehash familiar theses: ‘The West is threatening Belarus’; ‘The opposition has sold out to the West’; or ‘Lukashenka is the guarantor of stability’. The ‘peaceful sky’ has become a key trope in the increasingly militarised pre-election political rhetoric, serving to remind Belarusians of their good fortune not to be involved directly in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

With over 1,200 political prisoners, an opposition forced into exile, and the closure of independent media and over 1,800 NGOs and political parties in recent years, one might have expected less government repression in the run-up to the election. Instead, human rights organisations have recorded a surge in the activities of the security forces since the election campaign started, including intimidation and blackmailing of potential activists at work, or dismissals due to presumed anti-regime activities back in 2020. The idea of using the military to protect polling stations has also been discussed. All of this suggests that the regime, itself traumatised by the events of 2020, is exaggerating the threat posed to it by society.

Led by opposition activist and 2020 presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Belarusian democratic forces in exile are calling on Belarusians to vote against all candidates. But in the absence of a fair electoral process, it will be difficult to verify how many voters follow this strategy.

Totalitarian tendencies and no new social contract

The period from 2015 to 2020 witnessed a certain liberalisation of the political regime and the normalisation of Belarus-EU relations. In 2014, Belarus adopted a neutral position vis-à-vis Ukraine and held relatively smooth, albeit not free elections in 2015 and 2016. In early 2016, the EU lifted most of its sanctions against Belarus after the government released political prisoners. The EU-Belarus Coordination Group and the EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue were subsequently launched, and Lukashenka was even invited to the Eastern Partnership summit. While the Belarusian authorities quietly promoted a Belarusian national identity, Belarus saw the emergence of a new civil society and a decline in values associated with conservatism and paternalism.

It was these societal changes that contributed to the broad anti-Lukashenka mass mobilisation in 2020, which caught the Belarusian authorities off guard. But the 2020 post-election crisis led to a shift in Belarus’s sociopolitical model, and there is little chance that the country will return to the pre-2020 status quo after the 2025 election.

There are signs that the state is moving from autocracy to totalitarianism as it strives to control all of society, including the private sphere. Non-state political participation is persecuted; the political role of the siloviki is growing; and the administrative apparatus is becoming increasingly loyal to Lukashenka. The purpose of elections is no longer to create a facade of democracy, but to demonstrate control over the political situation. Scholars note a fundamental societal rift after 2020, which runs deeper than the divide between supporters and opponents of Lukashenka and makes opposing groups increasingly antagonistic.

Against this background, it will be challenging for the current ruler to restore his legitimacy. For a long time, that was based on an unwritten ‘social contract’ between the state and society: The state would ensure political stability, security and relative well-being in exchange for most Belarusians forfeiting their civil freedoms and supporting the status quo. The 2020 protests and the repressions that followed contributed to the termination of that contract. A 2024 survey shows that almost half of urban Belarusians do not think that ordinary citizens are protected from the arbitrariness of the authorities.

Preconditions for a new dialogue with the West

The release of over 220 political prisoners since July 2024 can be seen as one attempt by Lukashenka to restore his domestic and international legitimacy. It is likely that more political prisoners will be released following the 2025 election. Yet given the new geopolitical realities, the regime will need to do much more than that to end Belarus’s diplomatic isolation and prompt a partial lifting of sanctions. At the very least, it will be expected to end repressions and stop supporting Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The country’s democratic forces are divided on the matter of obtaining concessions from Lukashenka. While the mainstream opposition led by Tsikhanouskaya is less willing to accept compromises, for a group associated with Valery Kavaleuski (a former member of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus) and family members of the political prisoners, all options are on the table, including bargaining with the autocrat. Which approach the West will favour will depend a lot on the course of the war in Ukraine and political developments in Western countries.

Olga Dryndova is a political scientist and editor-in-chief of the ‘Belarus-Analysen’ at the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen.