Shifting Allegiances: Families with a Russian Background and the German Election
German voters with a Russian background were once a safe bet for the CDU/CSU. Now their loyalties are more dispersed, with a significant share of them supporting the AfD and the BSW. A ZOiS survey shows how generational differences and the war against Ukraine are likely to influence their choices at the ballot box.
Among the Germans that can take to the polls on 23 February, 12 per cent have a migratory background, up from 9 per cent in 2013. Voters with a migratory background from the Russian Federation and other former Soviet states form the largest minority in the German electorate.
A multigenerational survey we conducted as part of the MoveMeRU project in the summer of 2024 yielded insights into the political leanings and voting intentions of people with Russian roots in Germany. We were particularly interested in the interactions between young adults who were socialised in Germany and parents who were raised in (Soviet) Russia. [1] The survey was complemented by numerous focus groups and in-depth interviews.
Low support for CDU/CSU, SPD and the Greens
Several surveys show that migrants from post-Soviet countries are less likely to support the SPD, the Greens and the FDP than migrants from elsewhere or the non-migrant German population. For a long time, the CDU/CSU was very popular among people with a post-Soviet background. In the 2002 federal elections, more than 70 per cent of naturalised voters from a former Soviet country supported them. This doubtless had a lot to do with the CDU/CSU’s calls for the ‘return’ of ethnic Germans. However, even before Russia’s war against Ukraine, this community’s backing of the Christian conservatives had waned considerably. The current CDU/CSU election manifesto restates a commitment to sanctions against Russia and making Putin ‘pay a high economic price’. This does not align with the view of a sizeable share of people with Russian roots that Russia is not solely to blame for the war. And while solidarity with the Belarusian opposition is underlined, there is no mention of the Russian opposition. Speaking to this weak spot, CDU representative Albina Nazarenus-Vetter emphasised that the party must regain the lost trust among ‘Aussiedler’ and ‘Spätaussiedler’. [2]
The governing SPD has adopted a more cautious response to the war in Ukraine. This restraint speaks to intra-party divisions over how to reformulate the party’s Ostpolitik, which historically aimed to achieve European security with Russia, and to the fear of a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO. The SPD’s election manifesto refers to the need for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine to end the war, emphasising at the same time that a Russian Diktatfrieden – dictated peace – would be unacceptable.
As our survey also finds, the Greens are unlikely to poll well among Germans with a Russian migration background. They have been very outspoken in their support of Ukraine and condemnation of Russia. The party’s election manifesto describes Putin’s Russia as the ‘preeminent threat to peace and security in Europe’, while also reaching out to those Russians ‘who are working for an end to the war, peace and freedom.’
The popularity of AfD and BSW
Unlike the Greens, the manifesto of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) contains claims that are shared by some voters with a post-Soviet background. The party calls for an end to sanctions against Russia and for the repair of Nord Stream 2, claiming that European security can only be achieved through cooperation with Russia. Moreover, several AfD MPs have family ties to former Soviet countries. One of them, Eugen Schmidt, has boasted that ‘We are the party of choice for Russian Germans!’ In October 2024 AfD MPs also called for the erection of a memorial to commemorate the ‘persecution and deportation of Germans from Russia’.
In line with previous studies, our data show that support for the AfD is nearly twice as high among people with Russian roots as it is in the general population. Interviews we conducted further corroborate the evidence that the AfD benefits from a heavily mediatised feeling of insecurity, the backlash to developments in the area of gender and sexuality, and the standpoints other parties have adopted on Russia.
The Kremlin’s favourite party must be the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW). Wagenknecht gets positive (and frequent) media coverage in state-aligned Russian media, which repeat her criticism of increased military expenditure in Germany. The party’s manifesto calls for ‘honest efforts’ to achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine that build on the diplomatic efforts of China and the Global South. And Wagenknecht regularly warns that any direct German involvement in the war would lead to World War III. Germans with a Russian background are almost three times more likely than the general population to support the BSW. Meanwhile, the party’s left-wing economic platform resonates with the economic preferences of a segment of individuals socialised in (Soviet) Russia.
When the apple falls near the tree
Our survey looked at ‘family convergence’, which refers to the similarity of political views and patterns of voting between generations. Whether they have a migration background or not, young adults and their parents are most likely to have similar political preferences if they support conservative parties. In our survey, two-thirds of children who support the CDU/CSU have a like-minded parent. This is the case for more than half of young AfD supporters and approximately 40 per cent of young SPD supporters. Where the AfD is concerned, family convergence is particularly high when both respondents are male or when the young adult has a low level of education. Convergence on the CDU/CSU is higher when children have a high income. There is much less convergence between the generations when it comes to support for the Greens or the BSW.
Compared to the general population, the children of people socialised in (Soviet) Russia are less likely to share their parents’ political preferences. These children may be exposed to ideas about politics in school and through friends that contradict the views of their parents. When young respondents with a Russian background were asked with whom they were most likely to talk about politics, they attributed a significantly greater role to friends than their contemporaries without a Russian background. The young adults in the focus groups also suggested that their parents were more deeply embroiled in Russian state media than they were.
Fading echo of Russian values among second generation
As the German electorate has become ethnically more diverse, there has been a marked shift in the country’s political landscape. In line with the ascent of the populist radical right across established democracies, the AfD has continued to rise. The question of how to respond to the security threat from Russia divides the electorate and the parties just as much as the issues of migration, domestic security and the larger societal transformations of the last two decades.
Voters with a migration history from Russia or other former Soviet countries often find themselves between worlds. Our research demonstrates that some of the values propagated by the Russian state are popular among that demographic, notably among the elderly. Given the importance of the family for political socialisation, an echo of such values persists among the offspring, even if young people with a Russian background are far less inclined to agree on political matters with their parents than their counterparts in the general population. A finding that suggests that the young in this community are becoming as diverse in their political views as the overall German electorate.
[1] Of a total of 2,080 respondents, 1,230 belong to the same family. Overall, 420 have a Russian background. See osf.io/nd7zg.
[2] Ethnic German repatriates from the Soviet Union. Spätaussiedler refers to those who came to Germany after 1993.
Dr. Félix Krawatzek is a researcher at ZOiS and head of the research cluster ‘Youth and Generational Change’ and the ERC-funded project ‘Moving Russia(ns): Intergenerational Transmission of Memories Abroad and at Home (MoveMeRU)’.