The Endless Hourglass? The Living Legacy of Soviet History in Germany
With its distorted historical narratives, Russia seeks to influence communities with a (Soviet) Russian background abroad – including in Germany. But does this strategy work? ZOiS surveys show that their views on the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall diverge from those of the general population.
Russia’s politicisation and weaponisation of history extends beyond its borders, targeting far-reaching diasporic communities. The Kremlin employs the Russkiy Mir concept as a geopolitical tool to sway Russian-speaking populations abroad by promoting tailored historical narratives. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), with its traditional proximity to Russia, and the left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance often echo these Kremlin-backed historical narratives, which resonate particularly among Russian-speaking migrants from the Soviet Union in Germany.
The AfD’s distorted historical narratives challenge mainstream interpretations of German history, particularly regarding World War II and reunification. The party employs historical revisionism to shape public perceptions of the past and redefine German national identity. The AfD also draws controversial parallels between today’s democratic government and the former GDR, while appropriating the legacy of the 1989 peaceful revolution.
People with a (Soviet) Russian background in Germany[1] find themselves navigating between Germany’s historical narratives and Russia’s revisionist interpretations, often backed by far-right or left-wing German politics. As part of the ERC-funded MoveMeRU project, our study explored these historical associations through intergenerational surveys conducted in Germany from mid-spring to mid-summer 2024. In collaboration with dimap, we surveyed around 1,900 respondents: approximately 1,500 from the general German population and about 400 with a (Soviet) Russian background. We examined what people associate with the Soviet Union, focusing on the period from Stalin’s death in 1953 to Gorbachev’s rise in 1985, as well as their perceptions of the ‘turning point’ (‘Die Wende’) of the late 1980s, a time of political and social transformations in East Germany that led to reunification. Our analysis reveals that nearly half the respondents express exclusively negative associations with the Soviet era. ‘Die Wende’ is generally perceived positively by respondents across diverse demographic backgrounds. First-generation (Soviet) Russian immigrants appreciate the resulting political freedoms and social changes, while the second generation holds more critical views.
More Than a Chapter: Associations with the Soviet Union
Negative associations with the Soviet Union are prevalent across all demographic groups, with nearly half of the respondents expressing exclusively negative views, this sentiment being particularly pronounced among those who strongly endorse democratic values. Around 15 per cent report both positive and negative associations, while a similar proportion expresses only positive views.
Respondents with exclusively positive associations are primarily from a (Soviet) Russian background, with about 20 per cent of this group belonging to that demographic – higher among older respondents – compared to just over 10 per cent within the general German population. Older respondents frequently emphasise the economic stability, social equality and international significance of the USSR. In contrast, the most commonly mentioned negative aspect across both the general population and those with a (Soviet) Russian background is the lack of political freedom.
While one in five respondents across all groups cites the absence of economic freedom, younger respondents with a (Soviet) Russian background mention this issue less often. Notably, one-third of younger respondents from this background did not provide an answer, marking the highest non-response rate among all groups.
Male respondents are more inclined towards negative associations, closely reflecting narratives about political repression and restricted freedoms during the Soviet period. Among the older generation, there is a subtle trend of positive sentiment, suggesting a sense of nostalgia for the socio-economic stability of that time. However, this nostalgia is tempered by significant concerns over the lack of personal freedoms and governmental control.
Individuals who express frustration over how Soviet history is portrayed are less likely to associate the era exclusively with negative aspects.
Educational attainment does not significantly impact associations with the Soviet era, but employment status shows a small yet statistically significant effect in reducing negative associations. Employed individuals tend to be less inclined to hold negative views of the Soviet period.
Die Wende
‘Die Wende’ is generally viewed positively by respondents from diverse demographic backgrounds, with strong support for advancements in political freedoms and European integration. However, perceptions vary on issues like private entrepreneurship and social trust. More than three decades after reunification, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s remarks on German Unity Day highlight both the progress and the persistent challenges in integrating the formerly divided societies. A dimap study reveals that many East Germans still feel marginalised and view themselves as second-class citizens, underscoring enduring divisions between East and West. This sentiment, coupled with the rising influence of the AfD, points to ongoing disparities in societal integration and regional identity.
Our survey findings reveal significant differences in attitudes between individuals with (Soviet) Russian backgrounds and the general German population:
- The first generation of (Soviet) Russian immigrants demonstrates a markedly positive view of political and social changes, with high approval rates for political freedoms (77 per cent) and freedom of expression (79 per cent). In contrast, the second generation exhibits more critical and ambivalent attitudes.
- While first-generation migrants and the national population generally support European integration, the second generation shows a significant decline in positive sentiment.
- The second generation with (Soviet) Russian backgrounds exhibits higher levels of neutrality and uncertainty in various areas, particularly regarding private entrepreneurship (34 per cent) and European integration (30 per cent). This uncertainty is less evident in the national population, especially concerning political freedoms and freedom of expression.
- The general population, especially among the older generation, expresses notable scepticism towards social trust (38 per cent) and the growth of private entrepreneurship (58 per cent). This scepticism contrasts sharply with the optimism of first-generation migrants, who may perceive their new environment more favourably.
There is a strong correlation between perceptions of political freedom and freedom of speech, underscoring the essential role of political openness in promoting free expression. This relationship also extends to support for European integration; individuals who experience greater political freedom are more likely to endorse European integration as a way to strengthen democratic governance and individual rights.
Through generational change, the relevance of historical memory in political discourse is evolving, as are attitudes towards the Soviet era and German reunification. An individual’s views on history may also have a bearing on their attitudes to social integration, their political preferences or general democratic values. As a result, the past is in constant motion – like an ‘endless hourglass’ that continually reshapes the present. Perceptions of the Soviet Union remain complex, with negative associations about political repression coexisting alongside nostalgic views of economic stability. ‘Die Wende’ is widely seen as a positive turning point, but it also brings to light unresolved tensions in integrating East and West Germany. The stakes are high – the Kremlin continues to weaponise historical memory to influence public opinion abroad, particularly targeting the second generation with a (Soviet) Russian background, while German domestic political forces exploit these narratives for their own agendas. Failure to address the challenges resulting from historical revisionism poses a risk not only to society’s cohesion but also to its democratic integrity.
[1] The term is not limited exclusively to individuals of Russian origin, but encompasses those individuals whose parents grew up in (Soviet) Russia before moving to Germany, as well as the younger generations raised in Germany.
Dr Hakob Matevosyan is a sociologist and a researcher in the ERC-funded project Moving Russia(ns): Intergenerational Transmission of Memories Abroad and at Home (MoveMeRU) at ZOiS.