The Impact of Wartime Trauma on Political Attitudes in Ukraine
Survey data reveal that Ukrainians who have suffered personal losses and severe hardship in the war with Russia are more likely to support military solutions, while those who have experienced less intense disruptions are more open to diplomatic pathways to returning Ukraine’s occupied territories.
The 2022 full-scale Russian invasion has reshaped Ukraine’s political landscape, creating unprecedented unity among the population at large and even political actors traditionally opposed to each other. For example, prominent politicians, including former presidential candidates Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, publicly agree that holding elections during wartime is impractical and dangerous.
Elections in these circumstances would align only with the Kremlin’s objective of fostering internal division and instability. That could pave the way to a pro-Russia puppet government by means of intense propaganda on social media – a scenario witnessed in Hungary, Georgia, and Slovakia and narrowly avoided in Romania’s aborted 2024 presidential election.
Historical precedents underline the importance of political unity. From the Cossack Hetmanate to the turbulent years of 1918–1922, Ukraine has repeatedly suffered from internal divisions exploited by Moscow. This lesson appears to resonate widely: today, Ukrainians overwhelmingly recognise the need to support democratically elected authorities as part of a resilient state committed to defending its sovereignty and citizens. The first tasks are to establish a stable peace, including reliable security guarantees, and to bring Russian war criminals to justice. Only then will Ukrainians – not Russian President Vladimir Putin or anybody else – decide when and how to hold elections.
Challenges of surveying wartime public opinion
A research project at the Competence Network Interdisciplinary Ukrainian Studies (KIU) aims to study how wartime violence affects Ukrainians’ political preferences, including their participation in elections and attitudes towards a stable peace. For this project, a dataset of 2,000 Ukrainians was collected in late 2024 through the Omnibus survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, which is widely respected as one of Ukraine’s oldest and most reputable polling organisations.
Conducting reliable public opinion surveys in wartime is fraught with challenges. Massive migration complicates the accuracy of surveys; millions have fled Ukraine, while others remain in territories occupied by Russia or have been deported to Russia, where their freedom of expression is restricted by a highly oppressive police state. Despite these limitations, public opinion surveys remain essential for understanding the views of those who have stayed in Ukraine. Using survey weights based on data from 2021 helps to mitigate some of these challenges.
Public opinion on restoring Ukraine’s 1991 borders
The survey data reveal nuanced public attitudes towards the war and potential peace negotiations. Respondents were asked two questions: whether Ukraine should engage in peace talks without preconditions; and whether it should continue fighting until it has restored its 1991 borders, including Crimea and Donbas. It is clear that Ukrainians will never accept the occupation of their territory by Russia, but the question is how to achieve the restoration of the 1991 borders.
The results indicate complex perspectives: 41 per cent of respondents opposed unconditional peace talks but also rejected the military de-occupation of all territories, instead probably favouring diplomatic and political solutions. Meanwhile, 26 per cent firmly supported fighting on until Ukraine’s full territorial integrity is restored, while rejecting peace without preconditions.
By contrast, 22 per cent were in favour of unconditional negotiations and opposed continued fighting, instead emphasising political or diplomatic ways to return the territories that Russia has occupied since 2014. A smaller group, 11 per cent, paradoxically supported both unconditional negotiations and continued fighting, suggesting uncertainty or mixed views on conflict-resolution strategies.
This distribution highlights Ukrainians’ nuanced opinions about conflict resolution in a country that remains democratic and open to different opinions despite the Russian aggression.
Experiences of wartime violence and political preferences
The research specifically investigated how personal experiences of violence and hardship influence political opinions and voting behaviour. Preliminary results indicate, somewhat surprisingly, that exposure to violence during the war does not significantly affect voter turnout or election engagement.
However, direct personal losses do significantly shape views on conflict resolution. Those who had lost relatives or close contacts because of the Russian aggression were substantially less likely (by approximately 10 percentage points) to support unconditional peace talks and more likely (by around 7 percentage points) to favour the military restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Likewise, respondents who had experienced major inconveniences, including life-threatening shortages of essential resources like food and medical assistance, were about 11 percentage points less likely to support peace negotiations without preconditions.
In contrast, minor inconveniences like power outages, which are widespread across Ukraine, correlated with an increased openness to unconditional negotiations and reduced support for continued military action to liberate all territories of Ukraine occupied since 2014. Internally displaced people showed less support for military solutions, likely reflecting a preference for diplomatic means or increased sanctions pressure to restore Ukraine’s 1991 borders.
Defending Ukraine or defending Europe?
While Russia commits war crimes by killing, raping, and torturing civilians, brainwashing children, and erasing national identities, Ukrainians are far from surrendering and are determined to fight for their freedom and that of Europe. But if Ukraine fails, Russia will become an even larger and more direct threat to European peace and security.
The people of Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968, Tbilisi in 1989, Vilnius in 1991, and Crimea and Donbas in 2014 all witnessed Russia’s pattern of violent interference, which has repeatedly crushed democratic aspirations across Eastern Europe.
In the face of Russia’s aggressive imperialism, most Ukrainians realise that the Kremlin cannot be trusted and that a peace agreement cannot be relied on. Russia will continue to attack its neighbours as long as it receives enough money from oil and gas exports. It is therefore very important that the free nations of Europe increase their support for Ukraine in its fight for pan-European peace and prosperity.
Dr Maksym Obrizan is an Associate Professor at the Kyiv School of Economics (Ukraine) and a non-resident fellow at the Competence Network Interdisciplinary Ukrainian Studies Frankfurt (Oder) – Berlin (KIU).