The Political and Cultural Fate of Karabakh Armenians in Armenia
Most Karabakh Armenians who fled Nagorno Karabakh in September 2023 were drawn to Armenia as their ‘mother’ state. Previous surveys show that they have a strong Karabakh-Armenian identity and seek their own political and cultural representation. But the Armenian government has other plans.
The Azerbaijani military offensive in September 2023 led to the reintegration of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan and a mass exodus of Karabakh Armenians. While some of them moved on to Russia or Europe, most tried to start a new life in Armenia. Today, at least one in every 30 people living in Armenia is a refugee from Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian government has assumed responsibility for many of the practicalities of integrating them into Armenian society. The initial empathy in Armenian society was huge and the government support considered generous. However, government aid programmes have strained the state budget and it is not clear how long this support can be maintained. Out of a population of three million people in Armenia, 24.8% are already living below the poverty line, and the amount of international aid targeted at displaced people from Nagorno-Karabakh has been insufficient. But beyond the question of material support, how has being uprooted from their native land affected the Karabakh Armenians’ political and cultural identity? This contribution sheds light on the fate of the Karabakh-Armenian identity, the risk of assimilation, and the likelihood that Karabakh Armenians will be granted minority status within Armenia.
National and political identity
According to data from the National Security Service (NSS) of the Republic of Armenia, as of May 2024, 17,269 displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh had left Armenia, of which 7,138 have returned. This happened despite Prime Minister Pashinyan’s assurances that the government would do everything to ensure that the people of Karabakh remain in Armenia. The former bureau of the human rights commissioner of Nagorno-Karabakh declared in April 2024 that more than 30 per cent of the displaced are considering emigrating to third states. In principle, all Karabakh Armenians have the right to apply for Armenian citizenship. However, according to the Armenian Ministry of Interior, of the 79,000 displaced Karabakh Armenians who had completed the registration process by March 2024, only 1,437 applied for citizenship.
The former de facto elites of Nagorno-Karabakh have attempted to create a government-in-exile. They have become a thorn in the side of the Pashinyan government and their ideas have been forcefully repudiated. The speaker of the Armenian Parliament, Alen Simonyan, stated that there can be no Karabakh state within Armenia and that Armenia will not provide money to maintain the political institutions of Karabakh. The dissatisfaction of Karabakh Armenians with the authorities in Armenia on a political level is noticeable, in particular on social media.
Past identification patterns
In order to understand the Karabakh Armenians’ current national and cultural identity, it makes sense to look to the past. As part of a research project at ZOiS, unique survey data1 from Nagorno-Karabakh (2011 and 2020) was analysed in order to trace the evolution of identification patterns and draw conclusions for the future of Karabakh Armenians.
The surveys indicated strong ethnic, linguistic and religious homogeneity among Karabakh Armenians, with practically everyone identifying as Armenian and expressing huge national pride. The fact that a majority of respondents had lived in the same place for more than 20 years (Figure 1) explains the strong bonds between the people and their allegiance to the de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The survey also revealed a high level of pride in the ethnic group (Figure 2) and its historical past, indicating a strong group identity.
The unresolved territorial conflict had a negative effect on the respondents’ mobility and connections to other states. The process of obtaining travel documents became cumbersome and travelling in and out of the region was hampered by difficult logistics and socio-economic constraints. Only 5.4% reported having a family member who lived outside the de facto state, 8.1% had an international passport, and slightly under 3% had travelled to countries other than Armenia more than once (Figure 3).
Regarding their political views, Nagorno-Karabakh residents have tended to be divided. The survey revealed that almost equal shares of respondents preferred three different political systems: that of the de facto state, the Soviet system, and that of Western democracies and Armenia. Furthermore, Karabakh Armenians were divided on the question of whether they wanted independence or unification with Armenia.
In this regard, there was a clear correlation (Figure 4) between support for an independent state and high levels of national pride, often rooted in a sense of victimhood.
The data confirmed that Karabakh Armenians have lived for several decades in isolation and have formed a particular cultural identity that differs from that of the Armenian mother state. This finding casts doubts on the smooth integration of Karabakh Armenians into the Armenian majority society in the coming years.
Cultural rights, minority status and risk of assimilation
At present, the problem of the Karabakh Armenians has been reduced to humanitarian issues and is no longer a focus of international attention. Nevertheless, Karabakh Armenian representatives have asked the Armenian authorities to provide them with the possibility of creating a community life in order to preserve their culture and traditions. The failure to take these wishes into account and the outright suppression of Karabakh-Armenian political representation could damage the relationship between the Armenian majority society and the Karabakh-Armenian community. It would also impede the integration of the latter. The findings from the two survey waves of 2011 and 2020 illustrate that the Karabakh Armenians are a proud ethnic group with a strong sense of belonging and identity. The fact that they have lived for a long time in relative isolation, detached from the Armenian titular nation, does not make it easy for them to diffuse into contemporary Armenian society. Nevertheless, the risk of assimilation exists, and currently the prospects that the community will be able to preserve its cultural and political identity are bleak. Many, especially young people, will come to terms with the idea of integrating into Armenia. But for the majority whose political views and personal fate have been so closely bound to their home region, integration remains the second-best solution.
1The survey was conducted by the Sociological Research Centre at the Armenian Academy of Sciences in Yerevan (first wave) and the Caucasus Research Resource Centre Yerevan (second wave). Both surveys were conceived and guided by a multi-national team of researchers. Data collection was partially funded by US National Science Foundation grant number 1759645 (with John O’Loughlin as Principal Investigator).
Dr Ivaylo Dinev is a political scientist and a postdoctoral researcher at ZOiS, where he coordinates the KonKoop research network’s multi-method data laboratory.
Dr Nadja Douglas is a researcher at ZOiS within the KonKoop network, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.