Ukraine: Zelenskyi’s Legitimacy Undisputed
There have been expressions of doubt – not least by the US administration – as to whether Volodymyr Zelenskyi is still the legitimate President of Ukraine. However, the suspension of elections under martial law is not only common practice but also a way of protecting democratic standards.
Translated from the German by Hillary Crowe.
The provocation and humiliation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi by Donald Trump and JD Vance at the White House sent shockwaves across Europe and accelerated efforts to present a stronger and more united front in European foreign and security policy. Compared to the unprecedented on-camera clash, other more casually uttered false statements by Trump and his administration may pale into insignificance. But herein lies another dangerous weapon in the battle to control the narrative about developments in Russia’s war against Ukraine – one which defines the framework for negotiations and further weakens Ukraine’s position. This repertoire includes Trump’s and his allies’ attempts to delegitimise Zelenskyi as president and negotiating partner. With this approach, Trump aligns himself with Putin’s position, whose motives for waging war include toppling the government in Kyiv and replacing it with a puppet regime. The erroneous narrative that the Ukrainian President lacks legitimacy has been amplified by the US administration and leaves at least a question mark over Zelenskyi’s presidency and Ukraine’s democracy in parts of the public discourse in Europe too.
Trump must have felt certain that there would be limited pushback against his baseless assertion that Zelenskyi’s approval ratings in Ukraine stand at just 4 per cent, or he believed that any fact-checking could be dismissed easily. However, this type of false claim is only impactful where knowledge of Ukrainian politics and society remains limited. It is important to get the facts straight and communicate research that debunks disinformation.
Poll ratings remain unchanged
Opinion polls in Ukraine – which face tougher methodological challenges in wartime but can certainly be conducted with scientific rigour in Ukrainian-controlled territory – clearly refute the figures bandied about by Trump. In collaboration with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the MOBILISE and IBIF research projects, in which ZOiS is involved, have been monitoring the mood within Ukrainian society for years. Using comparative figures from before and after 2022, we can systematically track the approval ratings. Although the initial ‘rally 'round the flag’ effect from 2022 – which sent support for Zelenskyi soaring as high as 85 per cent by July 2023 – has abated somewhat over the years, his approval is still very high. Indeed, our latest survey in January 2025 found a further slight uptick in Zelenskyi’s approval ratings to 63 per cent (‘fully/somewhat approve’). Other surveys with slightly varying questions have documented support of 55-65 per cent, with no major regional differences. In the most recent data published in the Economist, a survey which members of our MOBILISE and IBIF team advised on, found that in the aftermath of Trump’s and Vance’s attempt to humiliate Zelenskyi his approval rose to 72 per cent.
Playing down the clear, ongoing and once again growing majority support for Zelenskyi links in seamlessly with the misguided call for snap elections in Ukraine. Since Zelenskyi’s term of office was prolonged by martial lay beyond May 2024, discussions – not only in Russia, but also in the US and Europe – about the President’s supposed lack of legitimacy have become more vocal. This notion purports to be pro-democratic and creates space for itself space in the public discourse primarily through right- and left-wing populists. However, elections are currently prohibited while Ukraine is under martial law, which does not continue automatically but must be extended by the Ukrainian parliament every three months. Restrictions such as these are typical of times of war. The UK postponing its general election during World War II is a prominent example. Under Germany’s Basic Law, for example, elections would be suspended for up to six months after the end of hostilities.
Elections now would be undemocratic
Elections per se are no guarantee of democracy. Authoritarian states, including Russia, regularly hold sham elections, thereby showcasing their supposed legitimacy. But democratic elections must guarantee free and fair participation for everyone who is eligible to vote. This is currently impossible in Ukraine. Around five million Ukrainian citizens in Russian-occupied territories, as well as military personnel and people living near the front lines would, in the main, be excluded. Nor would there be any guarantee that the majority of the about four million internally displaced persons in Ukraine and around 6.5 million displaced Ukrainians abroad would be able to take part. Moreover, polling stations would be exposed to an increased security risk from potential attacks. The introduction of an e-voting system is neither practical nor legally safeguarded at present.
Elections in Ukraine would also force a process of political polarisation. Candidates would build their campaigns on new dividing lines, for example, their support for or rejection of certain military decisions. Early elections may thus undermine social cohesion with no real possibility of identifying realistic alternative policies. And for a country at war, the financial burden of an election is not trivial either: the costs of running a presidential election are estimated at 200 million US dollars, not to mention time and prioritisation as resources in the midst of war.
Even Zelenskyi’s rivals oppose elections
Various opinion polls clearly show that in contrast to Putin and Trump, the issue of elections is no priority at all for Ukrainians: according to MOBILISE data 70–80 per cent think that Zelenskyi should remain in office until the end of the war. Indeed, since the clash at the White House, this basic societal consensus has been reflected in public statements by Zelenskyi’s political opponents, including his predecessor Petro Poroshenko and Kyiv’s Mayor Vitali Klitschko. 400 NGOs have signed a statement on the impossibility of democratic elections without a sustainable peace. The polls also show that a majority of Ukrainian citizens currently see no alternative to Zelenskyi. While the numbers of those who say they would vote for him are lower than his current approval ratings, the gap between Zelenskyi and other politicians is wide.
More than 30 per cent of respondents in the IBIF survey in November 2024–January 2025 said that if elections were held, they would vote for Zelenskyi. Only General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and now Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom, is similarly popular, but he has not declared any electoral ambitions. In fact, he too made clear that wartime is not the time to talk about elections. All the other currently visible politicians, especially Petro Poroshenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, are trailing a long way behind Zelenskyi with 4–6 per cent. Recent attempts by the US administration to forge links with Tymoshenko and Poroshenko with a view to a change of leadership are therefore misguided. In view of the clear numbers, this strategy is baffling, but aligns with the Kremlin’s demands for a new ‘regime’ in Kyiv as a condition for peace talks. Russia would also actively attempt to support candidates who are open to cooperation with Russia. However, their move into leadership positions in an election against the backdrop of war can almost certainly be ruled out.
Ukraine cannot escape the democratic challenges that lie ahead after the war ends, but these challenges will mainly hinge on whether a future ceasefire or ‘peace’ in Ukraine is perceived as fair and just.
Gwendolyn Sasse is the Director of the Centre for East European and International Studies and Einstein Professor for the Comparative Study of Democracy and Authoritarianism at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Olga Onuch is Professor in Comparative and Ukrainian Politics at the University of Manchester.
‘Identity and Borders in Flux: The Case of Ukraine’ (IBiF) is a survey project, funded by the British Academy under the ‘Tackling the UK’s International Challenges’ Funding Scheme, that studies identity, public opinion and political behaviour in Ukraine in wartime. Based at the University of Manchester and led by Professor Olga Onuch, the IBIF project brings together scholars from the United Kingdom, Germany, Ukraine and the United States.
Onuch O., Kulyk V., Hale H., Sasse G. (2024). IBIF Project: Wave Two National Representative Panel Survey of the Ukrainian Population (November 2024-January 2025). Identity and Borders in Flux (IBIF): The Case of Ukraine.