What is at Stake in Moldova’s Presidential Election and EU Referendum

Under Maia Sandu, the presidential apparatus has once again become the political centre of power in Moldova. Sandu, who is the first woman ever to hold the post, won the last presidential election in 2020 on the basis of her commitment to integrity and competency. One year later, her party PAS (Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate – Action and Solidarity Party) won the parliamentary elections and has since held 63 of 101 parliamentary seats. This means that the government party has a sufficient majority to pass laws on its own. It has presented the country with an ambitious reform agenda, addressing major challenges such as corruption, institutional reform (notably of the justice sector) and the path towards European integration.

The country’s European orientation has received an unprecedented boost, reflecting most citizens’ desire for stability, prosperity and the rule of law. The EU rewarded Moldova by granting it candidate status in June 2022. In December 2023, the EU Commission decided to open accession talks with the country.

The president and the ruling PAS government are counting on broad popular support for EU accession in the referendum. Yet, there are some unknown factors. Thanks to the clever move of linking the referendum to the election, it is almost guaranteed that the necessary quorum of 33 per cent of the population will be reached to validate the result. However, a two-thirds majority will subsequently be needed in parliament to pass the law required to amend the constitution. Moreover, the external pressure is high: On the one hand, there is the influence and infiltration of the election process by Russia, which is a historical liability and continues to be a serious problem for the Moldovan government. Various pro-Russian groups and forces are mobilising against the ruling PAS party and its European project. There is in fact considerable discontent with the ruling government in structurally weak regions, especially in the south of the country, where it is seen as a project of the establishment in the capital Chișinău. On the other hand, the high expectations of the EU are putting the country under additional pressure.

Electoral framework and candidates

The upcoming presidential election as well as the projected parliamentary election in February 2025 will be another stress test for the country’s political system and electoral framework. In December 2022 a new Electoral Code was adopted that provides authorities with additional tools to address the risks of voter corruption and illicit funding.

Twelve candidates from across the political spectrum are currently running against President Sandu. According to polling data, Sandu takes a clear lead and has no serious competitors in the pro-European camp. The poll also found that 63.2 per cent of the population support Moldova joining the European Union. What the poll, however, does not show is a scenario where Sandu would not gain an absolute majority and would face a Moscow-friendly candidate in a runoff second round.

The so-called leftist and pro-Russian spectrum that opposes EU membership is dominated by a number of extra-parliamentary parties linked in one way or another to the Kremlin-backed oligarch-in-exile Ilan Shor. The Shor party was banned by the Moldovan Constitutional Court in June 2023, after Shor was sentenced to 15 years in prison in absentia for fraud in connection with the ‘banking scandal’ of 2014–2015. Since then, a number of clone parties have been revived or newly founded. In April 2024, Shor together with other politicians founded the electoral block ‘Pobeda’ (Victory) in Moscow. It failed, however, to register as a parliamentary group. The left, partly pro-Russian camp, including the formerly powerful Communist (PCRM) and Socialist (PSRM) parties, tried in vain to agree on a common candidate. There are deliberate moves to sow confusion and division in society by diluting the pro-European camp and pushing candidates that are essentially pro-Russian, but are attempting to present themselves as pro-European in order to target the centrist electorate. One of those candidates is the former prosecutor general of Moldova Alexandr Stoianoglo, nominated by the Party of Socialists (PSRM) around former president Igor Dodon. Most Shor-backed candidates have been blocked from running by the Central Election Commission (CEC). Nevertheless, there are still candidates with links to Shor that managed to register, among them Vasile Tarlev (former prime minister under the Communist Party and current leader of the Future of Moldova Party) and Victoria Furtună (former Anti-Corruption Prosecutor).

Moldova has so far held nine presidential elections. Despite recurring irregularities, they have always been considered as mostly democratic by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which has observed elections in the past and has been invited to do so again this time. The Moldovan NGO Promo-LEX, which is dedicated to election integrity, deploys national observers. It has issued a pre-electoral report unveiling undeclared expenses in the campaigns of several candidates.

Diaspora voting

The diaspora played an important role in Maia Sandu’s previous victory: 93 per cent of the electorate abroad voted for Sandu in the second round of the election in November 2020. However, expectations in the diaspora were huge, and many may have been disappointed by the delays in the reform process.

Two practical issues have characterised the campaign abroad: First, for the first time diaspora voters will be able to cast their votes by postal voting. Yet so far, this has only been implemented for Moldovan citizens in six countries that met the requirements. Second, the number of polling stations has once again become a controversial issue. By far the largest number has been set up by the CEC in Western Europe (60 in Italy alone). Meanwhile, contrary to the initially planned 20 stations, only five polling stations were subsequently foreseen for Russia – the country with the biggest share of registered Moldovan diaspora voters. The CEC explained this decision with reference to the worsened security situation. Now, under pressure from the Moldovan Foreign Ministry, the CEC has reduced that number to just two. The dispute between the CEC and the Ministry over polling stations is being conducted openly and has fuelled protests in Moscow, where demonstrators have also criticised that the number of ballots is insufficient for the large number of Moldovan citizens in Russia.

Voters from Pridnestrovie can cast their votes in 30 polling stations on the right bank, but the candidates cannot campaign in the breakaway region.

Russian influence

The Kremlin’s strategy to destabilise the situation in Moldova by means of hybrid measures already became clear in the 2023 local elections, where PAS performed relatively badly and Russia reportedly spent USD 55 million on destabilisation campaigns. Apart from the spread of disinformation, these campaigns rely on malign financial flows, economic coercion, cyberattacks and attempts to influence public opinion via targeted news platforms. Just one month prior to the presidential election, fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor launched a new 24/7 online news network called M24 based in Russia, whose main purpose is to support Shor candidates. Moscow’s long-term goal is to regain influence in the country and drive out other external actors. Moldovan democratic forces are justified in their fears that vote buying among poor and vulnerable electorates and stoking separatist sentiments and tensions in the southern region of Gagauzia and, of course, Transdniestria could affect not only the outcome of the upcoming election and referendum but also threaten Moldova’s path to democracy and European integration in the long run.

Dr Nadja Douglas is a researcher at ZOiS within the KonKoop network, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.